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Abstract
Changes in patent law, global competition, and the rise of several new technologies suggest that patents could be of
greater value than secrecy for many innovative firms, particularly small firms that are unable to use market power or other
Ž. factors to appropriate their investments in innovation. Data from the 1993 European Community Innovation Survey CIS for
up to 2849 R&D-performing firms is analysed to determine the relative importance of secrecy vs. patents. This particular
combination of appropriation methods is interesting because secrecy can act as a mutually-exclusive alternative to patents.
The results show that a higher percentage of firms in all size classes rate secrecy as more valuable than patents. However,
ordered logit regressions show that the probability that a firm rates secrecy as more valuable than patents declines with an
increase in firm size for product innovations, while there is no relationship for process innovations. The firm’s R&D
intensity has no effect on the relative value of secrecy vs. patents. There is weak evidence to show that participation in
cooperative R&D increases the value of patents over secrecy for product innovations. The results are relevant to ongoing
debates over changes to the patent system and the need for policies to encourage small firms to patent more. q2001 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Both anecdotal and empirical research suggest
that patents have increased in importance since the
early 1980s. The evidence for this ranges from a
marked increase in the number of patent applications
in the United States, from approximately 60,000 in
Ž. 1984 to 120,000 in 1995 Kortum and Lerner, 1999 ,
to the decision of several large firms, such as Texas
Instruments and IBM, to aggressively pursue licens-
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Ž ing revenue from their patented inventions Thurow,
. 1997 . These changes are partly thought to be driven
by the establishment in 1982 of a new Federal Court
of Appeals, which strengthened the ability of firms
to enforce their patent rights in the United States. A
second possible explanation is an increase in the
economic importance of proprietary knowledge, due
to a shift from competition based on price towards
competition based on technical innovation. A third
explanation is the rise of new technologies, such as
biotechnology and information technology, where a
large number of small firms have been active. These
small firms could rely on patents to signal expertise,
0048-7333r01r$ - see front matter q2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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either to attract research partners or investment
Ž. Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998 . All of these factors,
taken together, are thought by some observers to
have created a ‘pro-patent era’.
A shift in business strategies towards patenting
could be marked by either an increase in patent
Ž propensity rates the percentage of innovations that
. are patented or a more intensive exploitation of
patents, or both. Whether or not either of these
outcomes has occurred is subject to debate. Both
Ž. Ž. Thurow 1997 and Granstrand 1999 use case stud-
ies and other data sources to argue that firms are
exploiting their patents more intensively. In contrast,
Ž. Kortum and Lerner’s 1999 analysis of patent statis-
tics shows that the increase in patenting in the
United States is more likely to be due to an increase
in the generation of patentable inventions than to an
increase in patent propensities, although their results
do not address the issue of whether or not patents are
exploited more intensively.
The European policy-making community tends to
accept the ‘pro-patent’ view, as illustrated by a
recent report on patent policy to the European Com-
Ž. mission ETAN, 1999 and the discussion of patent-
ing issues in major European policy documents such
as the Green Paper on InnoÕation and the First
Action Plan for InnoÕation. The possible rise of a
‘pro-patent era’ has created some concern, based on
the belief that the presumed decline in the global
competitiveness of European firms is partly due to
their failure to aggressively use patents to protect
their investments in innovation. The response of
policy-makers within the European Commission, as
shown by the policy prescriptions in the Green
Paper on InnoÕation and the First Action Plan for
InnoÕation, is to encourage European firms, particu-
Ž. larly Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises SMEs ,
to patent more. Another thrust of European policy is
to strengthen the patent system by lowering applica-
tion costs and by considering other changes, such as
the introduction of a grace period, that would permit
the release of information about an invention without
forgoing the right to apply for a patent at a later date.
These policy proposals to encourage patenting do
not always consider why firms might choose alterna-
tive appropriation methods to patents. Patents have
several disadvantages as an appropriation mecha-
nism, which partly explains why the majority of
innovations in the United States and Europe in the
Ž early 1990s were not patented Arundel and Kabla,
. 1998 . One important drawback to patents is the
requirement to fully disclose the invention, since the
disclosed information can release valuable informa-
tion to competitors on potentially profitable research
areas or how to invent around the patent. The impor-
tance of disclosure as a reason not to patent has been
established in both theoretical models of patent be-
Ž haviour Horstmann et al., 1985; Scotchmer and
. Green, 1990; Harter, 1993 and in survey-based re-
Ž search Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Cohen et al.,
. 1998 . Firms that do not wish to disclose information
can forgo patenting and use secrecy to protect their
investment in the invention.
Given that patents and secrecy are mutually ex-
clusive in this scenario, an interesting question is
which method is more effective as an appropriation
mechanism, and under what conditions? I would
argue that there is a widespread although subtle bias
on the part of some policy-makers, economists, and
jurists in favour of patents, which are seen as a ‘gold
standard’ for effective appropriation. As an example,
Ž. Friedman et al. 1991 comment that some of the
legal decisions in the United States on trade secrecy
suggest that ‘no rational person with a patentable
invention would fail to seek a patent’. Although
Friedman et al. then give three situations in which
secrecy would be preferred to patents, they agree
with the underlying assumption that patents are best.
Similarly, some of the theoretical literature assumes,
either implicitly or explicitly, that all inventions are
Ž. patented Tandon, 1982; Scotchmer, 1991 , leaving
no room at all for secrecy. The theoretical models of
patenting and disclosure also start with the assump-
tion that firms will patent all of their inventions
unless disclosure is of sufficient concern to impel the
firm not to patent, although a more balanced perspec-
Ž. tive is provided by Takalo 1998 .
This preference for patents is called into question
by the empirical evidence based on innovation sur-
Ž veys in the United States Levin et al., 1987; Rausch,
.Ž 1995; Cohen et al., 1998 , Europe Arundel et al.,
.Ž 1995; Harabi, 1995 , and Australia McLennan,
. 1995 . These surveys consistently show that manu-
facturing firms give secrecy a higher average rating
as an appropriation method for both product and
process innovations. The single exception is Japan,() A. ArundelrResearch Policy 30 2001 611–624 613
where firms give a higher rating to patents for
product innovations, although secrecy is more valu-
Ž. able for process innovations Cohen et al., 1998 .
The survey results for process innovations can be
explained by the ability of firms to keep process
innovations hidden from their competitors for long
periods of time. In contrast, the role of secrecy is not
as evident for product innovations, since once the
product is on the market it can be reverse-engineered
by competitors. This creates a puzzle. One explana-
tion is that secrecy could be used during the pre-
market development phase. This would give the firm
time to refine its invention and build up a lead-time
advantage over competitors.
These possible uses of secrecy for product innova-
tions show that patents and secrecy are not always
mutually exclusive appropriation methods, as as-
sumed by many of the theoretical models cited above.
A firm could use secrecy to protect an invention
during a development phase and then rely on patents
or other appropriation methods when the invention is
on the market. Of course, firms can also use secrecy
for some of their innovations and patents for others.
The ability of firms to strategically use both patents
and secrecy complicates an evaluation of their rela-
tive effectiveness. It also suggests that a clear under-
standing of appropriation strategies requires better
information about the conditions that impel firms to
prefer secrecy to patents — or the relatiÕe value of
secrecy vs. patents to appropriation.
One factor of policy significance, given the desire
in the European Union to encourage SMEs to patent
more, is the relationship between firm size and the
effectiveness of secrecy and patents. One possibility
is that small firms could find patents to be more
effective than secrecy. In addition to the value of
patents for small high-technology firms, as noted
above, small firms frequently lack the manufacturing
capacity or marketing networks to be able to rapidly
recoup their investment in innovation through the
sales of their own products. Consequently, these
firms could be forced to rely on patents to create a
breathing space from competition while they build
up their manufacturing or marketing capabilities. In
contrast, large firms could be less reliant on patents,
both because they can use their marketing strength to
create lead-time advantages and because large mar-
kets increase the financial returns from investment in
Ž process innovation Cohen and Klepper, 1992; Klep-
. per, 1996 , where patents are of less value than
secrecy.
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There are also several plausible reasons why small
firms could find patents of less value than large
firms, leading them instead to rely more on secrecy.
In addition to patent application costs, which could
be a greater barrier to small than large firms, small
firms could find it exceedingly difficult to protect
their patents from infringement, which would in-
crease the relative value to them of secrecy com-
pared to patents. This difficulty could be expressed,
relative to large firms, as either a higher level of
concern over legal costs or as a lower appreciation of
the effectiveness of patents as an appropriation
mechanism. Another possibility is that many small
firms, with the exception of those that are pursuing a
high-technology strategy, could be less likely than
large firms to develop patentable innovations. In-
stead, many of their innovations could be based on
minor incremental improvements that are not worth
patenting.
Policies to encourage firms to patent more, partic-
ularly high-technology SMEs, could improve the
competitiveness of these firms if patents are rela-
tively more effective, under real conditions, than
secrecy. In contrast, these policies could be less
effective than expected if firms find secrecy to be
more valuable than patents. Clearly, the design of
patent policy would benefit from empirical evidence
on the relative importance of secrecy and patents and
a better understanding of the factors that shape the
decision to keep an invention secret or to seek patent
protection.
The purpose of this paper is to provide some
empirical evidence of relevance to these issues, using
1 The greater manufacturing and marketing capabilities of large
firms imply that they should also patent proportionately fewer of
their innovations than small firms. Some evidence on this issue is
available from the PACE survey of Europe’s largest industrial
firms, although many of these ‘firms’ are in fact divisions with
sales in the range of SMEs. The PACE results show that the
percentage of both product and process innovations that are
Ž patented increases with sales as a measure of firm size Arundel
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the results of the 1993 Community Innovation Sur-
Ž. vey CIS in Europe. The empirical analyses focus
on three questions. First, what is the relative impor-
tance of secrecy vs. patents for European manufac-
turing firms? Second, do small firms find patents of
greater value than secrecy compared to large firms?
Third, what factors other than size influence the
relative importance of secrecy vs. patents? The re-
sults also provide some information of relevance to
the debate over a ‘pro-patent’ era, although it is not
possible to determine, using a cross-sectional survey
at one point in time, if the value of patents has been
changing over time.
The most important questions for European policy
concern the relative importance of patents and se-
crecy for Europe’s most innovative firms. For this
reason, all analyses are limited to a subset of R&D-
performing firms. Of course, firms that do not per-
form R&D can also develop patentable innovations,
but many firms in this group probably only develop
very minor innovations that do not meet the novelty
requirements for a patent. These firms are, therefore,
excluded in order to maximise the percentage of
firms that have the option of using patents, in addi-
tion to the option of using secrecy. Furthermore, a
few of the analyses are limited to a subset of highly
Ž. innovative firms with R&D intensities RDINTENS
above 10%.
The measure of the relative importance of patents
vs. secrecy is at the firm level and therefore differs
from the published results of other surveys which
compare average differences in the importance of
patenting and secrecy. For example, the most com-
monly used approach is to calculate the percentage
of firms that give a rating of ‘4’ or ‘5’ on a
five-point subjective scale. These are subject to
inter-rater differences in the interpretation of the
importance scale. Using relative scores, as described
below, avoids these problems.
The results show that firms of all sizes find
secrecy to be relatively more important than patents,
but small firms find secrecy to be of greater impor-
tance than larger firms. This relationship with firm
size, however, is less marked for small firms with
RDINTENS above 10%. Several additional factors,
such as the types of information sources used by the
firm, also influence the relative importance of se-
crecy vs. patents.
2. Data sources and methodology
The 1993 CIS contains information on the value
of both secrecy and patents for innovative manufac-
turing firms in Norway plus six EU countries: Ger-
many, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Den-
mark, and Ireland. For further details on the CIS
Ž. methodology, see Archibugi et al. 1994 . The com-
bined crude response rate for these seven countries is
36.1%, although the response rate varies from a low
of 22% for Germany to a high of 79% for Luxem-
bourg. The response rate exceeds 50% in Luxem-
bourg, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands. The
response bias in the 1993 CIS is in the direction of
more innovative firms. This means that the response
rate for R&D-performing firms is probably higher
than the overall response rate. This bias will also
favour the value of patents over secrecy, assuming
that R&D-performing firms are more likely to de-
velop patentable innovations.
A firm is defined in the CIS as innovative if it
introduced a product or process innovation between
1990 and 1992. This definition of an innovator in-
cludes firms that only make minor improvements or
introduce new products and processes developed by
other firms. Many of these ‘minor’ innovators might
not develop patentable innovations. To avoid this
problem, all analyses are limited to a subset of firms
that report that they perform R&D on a continuous
basis. A maximum of 2849 R&D-performing firms
are available for analysis, of which 1021 firms have
fewer than 100 employees and 1689 firms have
fewer than 250 employees.
2
2 Firms with more than 100 employees and with a reported
Ž. R&D intensity of over 100% less than 0.5% of the sample are
also excluded from the analyses because such high R&D intensi-
ties are unlikely to occur in firms of this size, suggesting either
errors in data coding, or that the firm is a legally independent unit
that provides R&D services to a much larger parent firm. In the
latter case, an accurate analysis would require linking the R&D
unit to the parent firm, which is not possible with the CIS data.
Firms with less than 100 employees and R&D intensities over
100% are included because many of them will be new
technology-based firms where R&D expenditures can exceed rev-
enue for many years.() A. ArundelrResearch Policy 30 2001 611–624 615
Fig. 1. Percentage of 2849 R&D-performing firms that give their highest rating to each appropriation method.
The relevant CIS question asks each respondent to
‘evaluate the effectiveness of the following methods
for maintaining and increasing the competitiveness
wx of product or process innovations introduced during
1990–1992’. The methods include patents, secrecy,
design registration, complexity of product design,
and lead-time advantages over competitors. Five or-
dinal response categories are provided, ranging from
‘insignificant’ to ‘crucial’.
One option for the presentation of descriptive
results is to use the mean score for patents and
secrecy, while another option is to use the percentage
of respondents who reply that an appropriation
method is ‘very significant’ or ‘crucial’. However,
both of these methods suffer from inter-respondent
variation in what is meant by each of the subjective
response categories. For example, a response of ‘very
significant’ for one firm could be equal to a response
of ‘slightly significant’ for another firm.
3 This can
create significant amounts of noise in the data that
can mask possible differences in appropriation meth-
ods by a variable of interest, such as firm size or
sector of activity. As an example, inter-rater differ-
3 Inter-rater differences can be checked by including different
questions about the same problem in the survey or by empirical
tests of what respondents mean by their ratings. Although these
Ž techniques are widely used in health surveys Streiner and Nor-
. man, 1995 , it is not possible to use these techniques for the CIS.
ences in the interpretation of a subjective scale could
have masked sectoral differences in the importance
of secrecy in analyses using data from the American
Ž Yale survey of the early 1980s Cockburn, 1992;
. 4 Cockburn and Grilliches, 1988 .
The method used here avoids these problems by
relying on the internal consistency of each respon-
dent’s answers. For example, assume that the respon-
4 Ž. Cockburn 1992 evaluates five possible causes for statistical
noise in the Yale survey: coding errors, scoring and scale con-
struction, respondent heterogeneity in the interpretation of the
rating scales, firm vs. sector conditions, and the wording of the
question. Many of these problems either do not apply to the 1993
CIS or the analytical method used here avoids them. First, coding
errors are unlikely to be a serious problem in either survey.
Second, the Yale survey asks the respondents to evaluate the
importance of each appropriation method for their ‘line of busi-
ness’, while the CIS asks for an evaluation for the respondent’s
own firm. The CIS version thereby avoids problems in confusing
conditions for the firm and for the sector. Another effect of this
change is that greater heterogeneity is expected in the CIS than in
the Yale survey, since micro differences at the firm level are
common, whereas the Yale survey should produce greater agree-
ment among the respondents about the importance of each appro-
priation method for their line of business. Third, the CIS question
is simpler than the Yale version, although there is still room for
improvement. Fourth, the remaining two problems with scoring
and inter-rater differences in the interpretation of the rating scale
are avoided by the method of analysis based on relative differ-
ences in the importance of patents and secrecy.() A. ArundelrResearch Policy 30 2001 611–624 616
Ž dent for firm A gives a score of 3 moderately
.Ž significant to patents and a score of 4 very signifi-
. cant to secrecy, while the respondent for firm B
Ž. gives a score of 5 crucial to patents and a score of
4 to secrecy. Both respondents give an equal score to
secrecy, but we do not know if the importance of
secrecy is objectively equivalent, since respondents
A and B could be using different subjective scales.
In contrast, we can safely assume that each respon-
dent gives internally consistent responses, so that the
relatiÕe importance of secrecy vs. patents is robust.
Using this method, we can conclude that the respon-
dent for firm A rates secrecy as more important than
patents while the respondent for firm B rates secrecy
as less important than patents. A further advantage of
this method for comparing two appropriation meth-
ods is that it is unaffected by the trend for large
firms to give all appropriation techniques higher
Ž. scores than small firms Arundel, 1997 .
This method is used to compare the relative im-
portance of different appropriation methods, to deter-
mine the relative importance of secrecy vs. patents,
and to serve as the dependent variable for a series of
regression analyses, as discussed below.
3. Descriptive results
In order to place the relative importance of patents
and secrecy in perspective, Fig. 1 gives the percent-
age of firms that gave their highest score to each of
the five appropriation methods.
5 Lead-time advan-
tages received the highest score from 54.4% of the
respondent firms for product innovations and from
46.7% of firms for process innovations. Both patents
and secrecy are given the highest rating by a notably
lower percentage of firms. There is little variation in
Ž. the rankings by firm size results not shown . For
example, lead-time advantages consistently receive
the highest ranking for product innovations across all
5 Tied maximum scores are divided equally between the rele-
vant methods. For example, assume that the highest score given
by firm A is 4, and that it is given to both patents and secrecy.
Both of these methods would then be allotted 0.5 firms each. The
percentages sum to 100% of the total firms for product and
processes separately.
eight size classes shown in Table 1 below, followed
by complexity, secrecy, patents, and design registra-
tion.
6
3.1. Firm size, secrecy, and patents
Table 1 gives the relative importance of secrecy
vs. patents for eight size classes. The rows in each
subsection of Table 1 for products and processes add
to 100%, aside from rounding-off errors. For exam-
ple, all 183 firms with less than 19 employees are
accounted for in the results for product innovations:
17.5% report that patents are more important than
secrecy, 38.3% give equal ratings to patents and
secrecy, and 44.3% give a higher score to secrecy
than patents.
The results for product innovations show that a
higher percentage of firms, in all size classes, rate
secrecy as more important than patents. Furthermore,
secrecy is relatively more important than patents for
small firms than for large firms. The trend for the
relative importance of secrecy to decline with firm
Ž. size is statistically significant ps0.001 . Most of
the trend is due to a decline in the percentage of
firms that give equal scores to patents and secrecy.
The results differ for process innovations. The per-
centage of firms that give a higher score to patents
than to secrecy remains comparatively stable, be-
tween 9.7% and 12.4%, with the exception of the
largest size class. The trend by size class is also not
statistically significant.
The results given in Table 1 are for all R&D-
performing firms, including firms that spend very
little on R&D. Since small, highly innovative firms
have attracted a great deal of policy interest, the
analyses were repeated after limiting the firms to
those with RDINTENS above 10%, as shown in
Table 2. The number of size classes has been re-
duced from eight to five to account for the smaller
6 The high importance given to lead-time advantages raises an
interesting possibility in respect to patents that would be worth
investigating in the future. Firms could forgo patenting if it
reduces the ability of the firm to pursue lead-time advantages,
e.g., if the time required to prepare patent applications distracts
staff from more important tasks. This could be one explanation for
Ž. Scherer et al., 1965 finding that the number of patent applica-
tions is closely related to the number of in-house patent lawyers.() A. ArundelrResearch Policy 30 2001 611–624 617
Table 1
Ž. Relative importance of patents and secrecy for all R&D-performing firms standard errors in parentheses
Employees N Product innovations Process innovations
Patents more Equal importance Secrecy more Patents more Equal importance Secrecy more
important important important important
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. -19 183 17.5 2.8 38.3 3.6 44.3 3.7 10.4 2.3 40.4 3.6 49.2 3.7
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 20–49 386 17.6 1.9 23.6 2.2 58.8 2.5 12.4 1.7 27.5 2.3 60.1 2.5
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 50–99 452 23.0 2.0 28.5 2.1 48.5 2.4 11.1 1.5 37.4 2.3 51.5 2.4
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 100–249 668 20.7 1.6 28.0 1.7 51.3 1.9 11.8 1.3 35.9 1.9 52.2 1.9
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 250–499 479 20.5 1.8 30.1 2.1 49.5 2.3 12.3 1.5 29.6 2.1 58.0 2.3
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 500–999 319 24.5 2.4 24.8 2.4 50.8 2.8 9.7 1.7 23.2 2.4 67.1 2.6
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 1000–1999 186 23.7 3.1 33.9 3.5 42.5 3.6 10.8 2.3 30.6 3.4 58.6 3.6
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. )2000 176 30.7 3.5 26.1 3.3 43.2 3.7 19.9 3.0 23.3 3.2 56.8 3.7
Significance of p-0.0001 ns
the trend by size
number of firms. The trend is no longer statistically
significant for either product or process innovations,
although for all size classes more firms find secrecy
to be more important than patents than the reverse. A
comparison of Tables 1 and 2 indicates that small
R&D-intensive firms find patents to be more impor-
tant than the average for all small R&D-performing
firms. For example, 33.3% of R&D-intensive firms
with a workforce between 100 and 249 employees
find patent more important than secrecy, compared
to 20.7% of all R&D-performing firms in this size
class.
3.2. Other influences on the relatiÕe importance of
secrecy Õs. patents
The results of Tables 1 and 2 establish that R&D-
performing firms rank secrecy as a more effective
appropriation mechanism than patents for both prod-
uct and process innovations. Furthermore, Table 1
shows that a higher percentage of small than large
R&D-performing firms give a higher rating to se-
crecy for product innovations, although there is no
notable difference by firm size for the most R&D-
intensive firms. However, before concluding that it
will be an uphill battle to encourage more patenting
among SMEs, it is important to address other possi-
ble influences on the relative importance of these
two methods and to check for confounding factors.
Other than firm size, three groups of factors come to
mind that could influence the relative importance of
secrecy vs. patents: the firm’s own innovation strate-
gies, the influence of different types of information
sources on the firm’s innovative activities, and tech-
nology effects linked to the firm’s sector of activity.
Sections 3.3–3.5 describe each factor and the con-
Table 2
Ž. Relative importance of patents and secrecy by firm size for R&D-intensive firms standard errors in parentheses
Employees N Product innovations Process innovations
Patents more Equal importance Secrecy more Patents more Equal importance Secrecy more
important important important important
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. -19 59 22.0 5.4 33.9 6.2 44.1 6.6 15.3 4.7 39.0 6.4 45.8 6.5
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 20–99 92 23.9 4.5 27.2 4.7 48.9 5.2 16.3 3.9 25.0 4.5 58.7 5.2
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 100–249 57 33.3 6.3 19.3 5.3 47.4 6.7 12.3 4.4 36.8 6.4 50.9 6.7
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 250–999 53 24.5 6.0 24.5 6.0 50.9 6.9 9.4 4.1 24.5 6.0 66.0 6.6
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. )1000 40 32.5 7.5 30.0 7.3 37.5 7.8 22.5 6.7 17.5 6.1 60.0 7.8
Significance of ns ns
trend by size() A. ArundelrResearch Policy 30 2001 611–624 618
struction of variables to capture their effect in the
regressions. The influence of these factors on the
relative importance of secrecy vs. patents is explored
using regression models.
3.3. InnoÕatiÕe strategies
Two measures of a firm’s innovative strategy are
constructed using the CIS data. First, an important
characteristic of a firm’s innovative strategy is its
RDINTENS. This could be positively related to the
value of patents by increasing the proportion of
inventions that are patentable, or by increasing the
value of competing on the basis of innovation rela-
tive to price. A positive effect for RDINTENS is also
suggested by the difference between Tables 1 and 2,
particularly for small firms, as noted above.
Second, the percentage of R&D spent on product
Ž. Ž. RDPROD and process RDPROC innovation could
influence the relative importance of secrecy and
patents. One would expect firms that focus on prod-
uct innovation to rate patents more highly than se-
crecy, and vice-versa for firms that focus on process
innovation.
3.4. Information sources
Firms can acquire the information that they need
to innovate from both internal sources, such as from
their own in-house R&D activities, and from exter-
nal sources, such as the technical literature, patent
databases, customers, their parent firm when applica-
ble, and through cooperative research with other
firms or publicly-funded research institutions. Firms
that extensively use external sources that require the
sharing of valuable information could find patents of
great value. An example is cooperative research,
where patents could play an important role in clarify-
ing ownership of the results. A recent study that
linked patent data to the CIS results for the Nether-
lands found that firms that participate in collabora-
tive R&D are more likely to apply for a patent than
firms that do not participate in collaborative R&D
Ž. Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999 . Alternatively,
firms that focus strongly on internal information
sources could give greater emphasis to secrecy. An-
other factor is related to ownership. Subsidiary firms
could rely on their parent firm for major innovations
and therefore find patents of less value than secrecy.
The CIS contains relevant data for three aspects
of information sources that are relevant to the trade-
off between secrecy and patents. First, the CIS con-
tains one question, in a yes-or-no format, that asks if
the firm had any cooperative R&D arrangements
with other enterprises or institutions in 1992
Ž. COOPRD . Second, another group of questions are
used to identify subsidiaries. Third, a series of ques-
tions ask about the value to the firm’s innovative
activities of both internal sources within the firm and
11 external information sources. A dummy variable
Ž. is constructed using this information INTERNAL .
Firms are classified as focusing on in-house informa-
tion sources if the rating for sources within the firm
is equal to or higher than eight external sources that
require sharing information.
7 Three publicly avail-
able information sources are not included in the
construction of this variable because they are less
likely to require the sharing of information and
therefore should not affect the relative value of
secrecy and patents to the inventive firm: patent
disclosures; conferences, meetings or journals, and
fairs or exhibitions.
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3.5. Technology or sector effects
Innovation surveys, including the CIS, have shown
that there are large differences in the effectiveness of
patents by sector of activity, with patents most useful
for firms that market products that are expensive to
develop but relatively cheap to imitate, such as
chemical compounds and mechanical equipment.
These differences can be partly captured by includ-
7 The eight external information sources are suppliers of mate-
rials and components, suppliers of equipment, clients or cus-
tomers, competitors, consultancy firms, universities, government
laboratories, and technical institutes.
8 Of course, information could be shared with other firms,
including competitors, at a conference or through attendance at a
Ž trade fair. However, the type of information that is shared or
. revealed is likely to be less important than the type of informa-
tion shared with other external sources such as suppliers or
customers, where firms could have built up a long-term relation-
ship.() A. ArundelrResearch Policy 30 2001 611–624 619
ing sector dummies in a regression model. The draw-
back to including sector dummies is that it does not
provide any information on what aspects of each
sector influence the effectiveness of patents. In ef-
fect, sector dummies do not help to explain why
there are differences by sector. An alternative ap-
proach is to try to identify the factors, operating at
either the firm or sector level, that influence the
effectiveness of different appropriation methods.
An important factor that should vary by sector
consists of the disadvantages of patents. These in-
clude the disclosure requirement and limits to the
effectiveness of patents in preventing imitation. Both
can act at the level of an entire sector as a result of
their link to other factors such as technological op-
portunity. For instance, the ability of firms to ‘invent
around a patent’ will partly depend on the number of
different technical solutions to a problem and the
rate of technical progress. Similarly, many low-tech-
nology sectors with few technological opportunities,
such as basic metals, should also find patents ineffec-
tive in preventing imitation since many technologies
are based on general engineering principles that are
not patentable.
Unfortunately, the CIS does not contain data on
the disadvantages of patents. Instead, this informa-
tion is obtained from 610 respondents to the PACE
survey of Europe’s largest industrial firms who an-
swered a question on the reasons why they did not
apply for a patent for one or more innovations. An
average measure of the disadvantages of patents by
sector is calculated from the percentage of firms that
rate at least one of two drawbacks to patents as
‘extremely important’: Alimits to the effectiveness of
patents in preventing imitationB or Athe amount of
information disclosed in a patent applicationB
Ž. PATPROB . Separate variables for each of these
disadvantages were also included in the regression
models, but did not provide robust results. This is
probably because these two disadvantages are linked
— a patent can be ineffective in preventing imitation
because it releases information, although there are
other factors that can limit effectiveness, such as a
high density of alternative technologies. Firms in
sectors where these two disadvantages of patents are
strong should prefer secrecy over patents. Sector
averages for patent disadvantages are only calculated
for manufacturing sectors with more than five PACE
respondents, which required excluding the printing
Ž. and publishing sector NACE 22 from the regres-
sion analyses given below.
9
3.6. Regression results
The dependent variable for product innovations in
the regressions consists of six categories of the dif-
ference between the respondent scores for secrecy
and patents. The highest value of the dependent
variable is given when the respondent rates secrecy
as three or more categories higher than patents. This
occurs, for example, when the respondent gives se-
Ž. crecy a score of 5 crucial compared to a score of 2
Ž. slightly important for patents. The lowest value of
the dependent variable occurs when secrecy is given
a score that is two or more categories lower than the
score for patents. The dependent variable for process
innovations consists of five categories. Although the
scoring system appears to be based on an interval
variable, it is important to emphasise that it is only
possible to assume an ordinal scale of measurement.
For this reason, the ordered logit is the appropriate
regression model to use since it makes no assump-
tions about the distance between two values of the
dependent variable. Details of the model are given in
Appendix A.
The results of four regression models, two each
for product and process innovations, are given in
Table 3. A positive coefficient for an independent
variable increases the probability that firms find
secrecy to be more effective than patents, while a
negative coefficient shows the reverse. Models 1 and
3 include sector dummies, while models 2 and 4
include the sector-level measure of the disadvantages
Ž. of patents PATPROB .
The measure of firm size used in these regressions
is not the number of employees, as in Tables 1 and
2, but the log of the absolute amount that the firm
Ž. spends on R&D LRDEXP . This measure of firm
size improves the fit of the model, although using the
log of the number of employees provides roughly
9 In total, results are available in PACE for 17 sectors with an
average of 36 respondents per sector, after combining three related
Ž. Ž. sectors, textiles NACE 17 , clothing NACE 18 , and leather
Ž. goods NACE 19 . These three sectors are also combined in the












































Ordered logit results for finding secrecy to be more important than patents to Amaintain and increase the competitiveness of innovationsB
Variable Product innovations Process innovations
1234
b p b p b p b p
Constant 1.583 0.000 1.202 0.000 0.363 0.024 0.180 0.288
Firm size
LRDEXP y0.084 0.007 y0.101 0.001 y0.062 0.059 y0.049 0.114
InnoÕation strategy
RDINTENS 0.003 0.977 0.001 0.990 y0.045 0.565 y0.050 0.602
RDPROD y0.143 0.120 y0.180 0.043
RDPROC 0.236 0.028 0.238 0.020
() Information sources both dummy Õariables
INTERNAL 0.154 0.002 0.150 0.002 0.038 0.447 0.041 0.400
COOPRD y0.089 0.078 y0.096 0.053 0.049 0.338 0.039 0.441
Sector leÕel Õariables
PATPROB 0.855 0.002 0.771 0.007
Sector dummies Yes Yes
2 Model x 122.3 0.0000 97.7 0.0000 273.3 0.0000 238.1 0.0000
All models include 1995 firms and control for the country of location, with Denmark as the reference country. The reference sector for models 1 and 3, which include sector
Ž. Ž . Ž . dummies, is food and beverages. The estimated threshold values m not shown in the table are statistically significant p-0.0000 in all models and increase monotonically.
The number of firms is less than in Tables 1 and 2 because of the exclusion of firms with one or more missing values for the independent variables. Results are similar when the
dependent variable consists of three categories, as used in Tables 1 and 2, or when an ordered probit model is used.() A. ArundelrResearch Policy 30 2001 611–624 621
similar results. R&D spending probably works better
than the number of employees because it is a more
accurate measure of the innovative size of the firm.
For product innovations, the relative importance of
secrecy declines with firm size, which means that
secrecy is more important to small than to large
firms. In contrast, firm size is only of borderline
significance for process innovations. Both of these
findings corroborate the descriptive results of Tables
1 and 2.
The firm’s RDINTENS has no effect on the rela-
tive importance of secrecy vs. patents, which con-
trasts with the earlier comparison of Tables 1 and 2.
This result suggests that what matters is not the
firm’s RDINTENS, but the absolute amount spent on
R&D. For example, a very large firm with relatively
high levels of R&D spending but a low RDINTENS
will follow a similar strategy on patents and secrecy
Ž. other factors being equal than a medium-sized firm
with the same amount of spending on R&D. A
comparable finding was noted in analyses of the
PACE survey data, which found that the absolute
amount spent on R&D had a much stronger influ-
ence on a range of innovation strategies than
Ž. RDINTENS Arundel et al., 1995 . The explanation
for this probably lies in the organisation of innova-
tion. An R&D lab of a given size probably follows
the same strategies as those of its peers, regardless of
the total number of employees within the firm.
The other variable for the firm’s innovation strat-
egy is the percentage of all RDPROD or RDPROC,
depending on the regression. RDPROD is negative,
as expected, but not significant in both models
for product innovations. In contrast, the equivalent
variable RDPROC is more robust for process in-
novations, indicating that firms that spend a high
percentage of their R&D expenditures on process
innovations are more likely to use secrecy to protect
them.
The two variables for information sources only
influence the results for product innovations. Firms
Ž. that focus on in-house information INTERNAL are
more likely to give secrecy a higher rating than
patents. In contrast, participation in cooperative R&
Ž. D COOPRD reduces the probability that a firm will
give a higher rating to secrecy than to patents,
although the results are of borderline significance.
This corroborates the results of Brouwer and
Ž. Kleinknecht 1999 and provides further support,
albeit indirect, for the theory that patents help to
clarify the ownership of the intellectual output of
cooperative R&D alliances. The firm’s status as a
subsidiary or as an independent firm had no effect in
any of the models and is therefore not included in
the regressions shown in Table 3.
The variable for the average disadvantage of
Ž. patents PATPROB , by sector, is strongly signifi-
cant and positive for both product and process inno-
vations. This supports the theoretical literature, which
finds that firms will use secrecy when disclosure is a
serious disadvantage to patenting. Another implica-
tion is that this sector-level variable is capturing
some of the effect that is normally covered by sector
dummies. However, it is not entirely clear if PAT-
PROB is capturing the same effect for different
sectors, since sectors where patents have a high
rating for disadvantages include several low technol-
ogy sectors such as food and beverages and several
sectors where patents are known to be of value, such
as chemicals and petroleum products.
The use of the relative importance of secrecy and
patents as the dependent variable in the regressions
has a considerable influence on the interpretation of
the value of patents and secrecy. For example, the
ordered logit analyses for product innovations were
repeated using the responses for secrecy alone as the
dependent variable. These range through five re-
Ž. sponse categories from ‘insignificant’ 1 to ‘crucial’
Ž. 5 . In this regression, the value of secrecy increases
significantly with firm size, in contrast to the decline
in the relative value of secrecy compared to patents
with firm size, as shown in Table 3. Similar results
Ž were found for patents in an earlier study Arundel,
. 1997 . These results are due to the fact that large
firms find all appropriation methods to be of greater
value than small firms. The failure to look at the
relative value of secrecy vs. patents would erro-
neously suggest that secrecy is less important to
small firms than to large firms.
4. Conclusions
The results of these analyses show that a higher
percentage of R&D-performing firms in all size
classes find secrecy to be a more effective means of() A. ArundelrResearch Policy 30 2001 611–624 622
appropriation than patents. This is also true when the
analysis is limited to firms with RDINTENS above
10%. Furthermore, small firms, on average, do not
rely more on patents than on secrecy in comparison
with large firms. Instead, small firms are less likely
than large firms to find patents to be of greater value
than secrecy for product innovations, although there
is little difference by firm size for process innova-
tions. These results are also confirmed by regression
analyses that include the effect of other factors.
There is one exception by firm size. As shown in
Table 2, small R&D-intensive firms do not differ
very much from large firms in their preferences for
either secrecy or patents, although a higher percent-
age of all R&D-intensive firms find secrecy to be
more important than patents than the opposite.
These results, showing that secrecy is an effective
alternative to patenting, suggest that we should also
see a negative relationship between the strength of
secrecy as an appropriation method and the patent
propensity rate. Relevant information on this issue is
available from an analysis of the PACE survey
Ž. Arundel and Kabla, 1998 . Firms that found secrecy
to be an effective appropriation method had a lower
propensity to patent product innovations than firms
that found secrecy to be ineffective.
The CIS results, based on thousands of firms
across the full spectrum of manufacturing sectors,
have some relevance to the debate over the existence
of a ‘pro-patent’ era. Between 1990 and 1992, patents
were less important than secrecy to most European
firms in this sample, including R&D-intensive firms.
This indicates that there are marked limitations to the
value of patents as an appropriation method. The
timing of the survey is also well within the ‘pro-
patent’ era, as shown by patent applications in the
United States, which had already increased by about
Ž 60% between 1984 and 1992 Kortum and Lerner,
. 1999 . It is possible that there could have either been
a lag in the adoption of pro-patent policies by Euro-
pean firms compared to American firms, or patents
could have markedly increased in importance since
1993. A possible lag is supported by slightly lower
patent propensity rates for European than American
Ž. firms in the early 1990s Arundel and Kabla, 1998 .
Ž. However, Cohen et al.’s 1998 recent comparison of
the results of two American innovation surveys, in
the early 1980s and then in the early 1990s, shows
that secrecy increased in importance relative to
patents over this time period. One possible explana-
tion is an increase in concern over the ease of
‘inventing around’ a patent. The paradoxical result is
that we could be witnessing a rise in the importance
of both patents and secrecy, with the latter increasing
in importance more quickly to make up for the
inadequacies of the former.
The finding that firms that engage in cooperative
R&D are more likely to find patents of greater value
than secrecy does, however, provide some support
for a pro-patent era, given an increase in cooperative
Ž. R&D over the last decade Granstrand, 1999 .
The results are relevant to three aspects of Euro-
pean innovation programmes: to encourage patenting
among all firms, to encourage patenting by high-
technology firms, and possible improvements in
patent legislation.
First, the results suggest that policies to encourage
overall patenting will not automatically influence
either the patent policies of firms or the competitive-
ness of European firms. This is because patents are a
relatively unimportant appropriation method in many
different sectors, with more firms finding secrecy of
greater value than patents than the opposite. The
regression results for PATPROB, or the disadvan-
tages of patents at a sector level, indicate that a
major reason for why firms prefer secrecy is concern
over disclosure or other limits to the effectiveness of
patents in preventing imitation. This result is in line
with theoretical models on the effect of disclosure as
a reason not to patent, but the strong relative impor-
tance of secrecy compared to patents in this study
suggests that future theoretical models should ex-
plore the opposite problem: under what conditions
will a firm decide not to keep its invention secret?
Second, a major area of European policy concern
is the competitiveness of small high-technology
start-up firms. In this respect, the similarity between
the relative importance of patents and secrecy among
small R&D-intensive firms and large R&D-intensive
firms suggests that the former do not need additional
government support for patenting. The appropriation
strategies of these small high-technology firms are
already similar to that of their larger peers.
Third, the results suggest one problem with cur-
rent patent legislation that deserves closer attention.
The fact that most small firms value secrecy more() A. ArundelrResearch Policy 30 2001 611–624 623
highly than large firms, even after controlling for
factors such as the sector of activity and RDINTENS,
is of concern. This difference is unlikely to be due to
smaller firms having few patentable innovations, be-
cause the analyses have intentionally excluded firms
that do not perform R&D and are, therefore, less
likely to develop patentable inventions. One explana-
tion of the difference is that small firms lack the
financial reserves to protect their patents from in-
fringement. If true, this would point to the need for
policies to provide a more level playing field for
infringement suits. This possibility was investigated
by looking for interaction effects between the mea-
Ž. sure of the disadvantages of patents PATPROB and
firm size. These analyses suggested that patent disad-
vantages were a more serious problem for small than
for large firms, but the results were not robust,
probably because this data was only available at the
sector level.
The results also raise several questions. One of
the main justifications for a patent system is to
disseminate knowledge through disclosure. This
could be socially beneficial by reducing the amount
that firms invest in R&D. The widespread use of
secrecy by firms could arguably be both economi-
cally inefficient and retard the rate of technical
progress, suggesting that patent policies should be
designed to encourage firms to patent rather than
using secrecy. However, repetitive R&D is not nec-
essarily an entire loss, since some R&D is required
for imitation and such R&D could also lead to
useful discoveries, since no R&D programme is
likely to be identical. Nor is secrecy likely to sub-
stantially slow down the rate of technical change, at
least for product innovations, which can be reverse-
engineered. How these factors play out in terms of
imitation lags and costs, or the effect of patents in
forcing competitors to explore new, unprotected av-
enues of research, could be a fruitful avenue for
further research.
Finally, there are at least two important limita-
tions to this study. The measure of the value of
secrecy and patents in the CIS is a composite of all
of the firm’s innovations. Their relative importance
could differ for the firm’s most economically impor-
tant innovation, or for innovations that include the
greatest technical advances. Second, with the excep-
tion of Germany, all of the data are from the smaller
European economies. Conditions could differ in the
larger European economies, as well as in other coun-
tries outside of Europe.
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Appenidx A
The ordered logit model can be used to examine
the impact of a range of exogeneous variables on a
dependent variable which takes a finite set of or-
Ž. Ž . dered values 1,2,...,n Liao, 1994 . The method
of estimation is maximum likelihood. The model
assumes that the dependent variable y is generated
by a continuous latent variable y
) whose values are
unobserved. The model assumes that there are a set









The unobserved variable y
) is modelled as a linear
Ž. function of the N,k vector of exogeneous variables
X:
y
)sbX q´ is1,...,N 2 Ž. ii i
where ´ has a distribution function f derived from i
the logistic cumulative distribution function:
Fxs1r 1qe
yx 3 Ž. Ž . Ž .() A. ArundelrResearch Policy 30 2001 611–624 624
Given the characteristics X of individual i, the i
probability that y is found in category k is: i
Prob Y s1rX sFr 1ybX Ž. Ž. ii i
Prob Y skrX Ž. ii
sFr k ybX yFr k y1 ybX Ž. Ž . Ž. ii
Prob Y snrX s1yFr n y1 ybX 4 Ž.Ž . Ž . Ž. ii i
The scoring of the dependent variables in the
regressions given in Table 3 are as follows: For
product innovations: 0ssecrecy two or more cate-
gories less than patents, 1ssecrecy one category
less than patents, 2ssecrecy and patents given equal
scores, 3ssecrecy given a score one category higher
than patents, 4ssecrecy given a score two cate-
gories higher than patents, and 5ssecrecy given a
score three or more categories higher than patents.
For process innovations: 0ssecrecy less than
patents, 1ssecrecy equal to patents, 2ssecrecy
one category higher than patents, 3ssecrecy two
categories higher than patents, and 4ssecrecy three
or more categories higher than patents.
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